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ToolsSugden, R. (2006) Hume's non-instrumental and non-propositional decision theory. Economics and Philosophy, 22 (3). pp. 365-391. ISSN 0266-2671
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Hume is often read as proposing an instrumental theory of decision, in which an agent's choices are rational if they maximally satisfy her desires, given her beliefs. In fact, Hume denies that rationality can be attributed to actions. I argue that this is not a gap needing to be filled. Hume's theory provides a coherent and self-contained understanding of action, compatible with current developments in experimental psychology and behavioural economics. On Hume's account, desires are primitive psychological motivations which do not have propositional content, and so are not subject to the criteria of rational consistency which apply to propositions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2013 16:14 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Jan 2025 15:05 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/44502 |
| DOI: |
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