Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly

Saha, Bibhas and Chatterjee, Ishita (2013) Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Economics Letters, 120 (2). pp. 280-283. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining power profit may perversely rise and the union’s utility may fall.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	11 Jun 2013 22:38
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2024 01:26
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/42477
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

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