Focal points in tacit bargaining problems:Experimental evidence

Isoni, A., Poulsen, A. ORCID:, Sugden, R. and Tsutsui, K. (2013) Focal points in tacit bargaining problems:Experimental evidence. European Economic Review, 59. pp. 167-188.

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We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues which define relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling's hypotheses, we find that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efficiency even in games where there is no efficient and equal division, and induces systematically unequal payoff distributions. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: tacit bargaining,relational cue,payoff-irrelevant cue,focal point
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 18 Feb 2013 13:18
Last Modified: 22 Oct 2022 23:59
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005

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