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Isoni, A., Poulsen, A. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595, Sugden, R. and Tsutsui, K.
(2013)
Focal points in tacit bargaining problems:Experimental evidence.
European Economic Review, 59.
pp. 167-188.
Abstract
We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues which define relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling's hypotheses, we find that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efficiency even in games where there is no efficient and equal division, and induces systematically unequal payoff distributions. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | tacit bargaining,relational cue,payoff-irrelevant cue,focal point |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | Julie Frith |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Feb 2013 13:18 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Apr 2023 23:32 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/41256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005 |
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