Bilateral bargaining in networks

Polanski, Arnold ORCID: (2007) Bilateral bargaining in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 134 (1). pp. 557-565.

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Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wollinsky [Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining, Econometrica 53 (1985) 1133–1150]. All pairs, which reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage–Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2013 14:21
Last Modified: 02 Feb 2023 10:30
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006

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