Bilateral bargaining in networks

Polanski, Arnold ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9146-6364 (2007) Bilateral bargaining in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 134 (1). pp. 557-565.

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Abstract

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wollinsky [Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining, Econometrica 53 (1985) 1133–1150]. All pairs, which reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage–Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance
Depositing User:	Julie Frith
Date Deposited:	18 Jan 2013 14:21
Last Modified:	18 Jun 2026 15:25
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/40861
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006

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