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Polanski, Arnold 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9146-6364
(2007)
Bilateral bargaining in networks.
Journal of Economic Theory, 134 (1).
pp. 557-565.
Abstract
Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wollinsky [Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining, Econometrica 53 (1985) 1133–1150]. All pairs, which reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage–Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance |
| Depositing User: | Julie Frith |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2013 14:21 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Feb 2023 10:30 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/40861 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006 |
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