Judgement aggregation without full rationality

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2008) Judgement aggregation without full rationality. Social Choice and Welfare, 31 (1). pp. 15-39.

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Abstract

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinstein’s group identification problem.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julie Frith
Date Deposited:	09 Feb 2012 16:20
Last Modified:	17 Aug 2023 11:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/37007
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-007-0260-1

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