The possibility of judgement aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

Dietrich, Franz (2010) The possibility of judgement aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2). pp. 603-638.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julie Frith
Date Deposited:	09 Feb 2012 16:04
Last Modified:	15 Aug 2023 16:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/36993
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003

Actions (login required)

View Item