Match-fixing under competitive odds

Bag, Parimal Kanti and Saha, Bibhas (2011) Match-fixing under competitive odds. Games and Economic Behavior, 73. pp. 318-344.

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Abstract

Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the ‘lemons’ (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	20 Apr 2011 10:11
Last Modified:	15 Dec 2022 01:23
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29674
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001

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