Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Saha, Bibhas (2003) Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]. European Journal of Political Economy, 19 (4). pp. 893-897. ISSN 1873-5703

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Abstract

This comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94] shows that their basic model can be simplified by an alternative formulation. A corrupt auditor gives two choices to a taxpayer: pay bribe and evade tax or be overtaxed. Although harassment can be redressed through court, the taxpayer chooses to pay bribe. However, as this note discovers, the bribe–income ratio will critically depend on whether the taxpayer can afford the court fees. This may lead different income groups to have different preferences for corruption.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	19 Apr 2011 08:12
Last Modified:	09 Aug 2023 13:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29580
DOI:	10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00046-6

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