On the evolutionary stability of 'tough' bargaining behaviour

Poulsen, Anders ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595 (2003) On the evolutionary stability of 'tough' bargaining behaviour. International Journal of Game Theory, 5 (1). pp. 63-73. ISSN 1432-1270

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether "tough" bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionarily stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as the Proposer does not directly observe the Responder's commitment to rejecting low offers.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	19 Apr 2011 08:03
Last Modified:	08 Sep 2023 12:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29576
DOI:	10.1142/S0219198903000891

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