Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies: Choosing between theories of harm?

Davies, Stephen and Olczak, Matthew (2010) Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies: Choosing between theories of harm? Review of Industrial Organization, 37. pp. 83-99.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy). This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore pre-merger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’ merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Gina Neff
Date Deposited:	12 Apr 2011 15:18
Last Modified:	15 Jun 2023 15:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29100
DOI:	10.1007/s11151-010-9259-3

Actions (login required)

View Item