Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: Evidence from EC merger cases

Davies, Stephen, Olczak, Matthew and Coles, Heather (2011) Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: Evidence from EC merger cases. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29 (2). pp. 221-231. ISSN 0167-7187

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Abstract

This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects. This subset of cases offers an opportunity to shed empirical light on the conditions where a Competition Authority believes tacit collusion is most likely to arise. We find that, for the Commission, tacit collusion is a rare phenomenon, largely confined to markets of two, more or less symmetric, players. This is consistent with recent experimental literature, but contrasts with the facts on ‘hard-core’ collusion in which firm numbers and asymmetries are often much larger.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Gina Neff
Date Deposited:	12 Apr 2011 15:18
Last Modified:	04 Aug 2023 15:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29095
DOI:	10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.05.005

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