Strassburg, Bernardo, Turner, Kerry, Fisher, Brendan, Schaeffer, Roberto and Lovett, Andrew ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0554-9273 (2008) An empirically-derived mechanism of combined incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation. pp. 1-42.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Despite accounting for 17-25% of anthropogenic emissions, deforestation was not included in the Kyoto Protocol. The UN Convention on Climate Change has recently decided to include it in future agreements and asked its scientific board to study methodological and scientific issues related to positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation. Here we present an empirically derived mechanism that offers a mix of incentives to developing countries to curb their emissions from deforestation while including important guaranties to the financing community. We use recent data both to model its effects on the 20 most forested developing countries and to produce empirical global cost curves of avoiding deforestation. Results show that at very low CO2 prices (~US$5.5/t) a successful mechanism could reduce 90% of global deforestation.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | sdg 13 - climate action ,/dk/atira/pure/sustainabledevelopmentgoals/climate_action |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Science > School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia Research Groups/Centres > Theme - ClimateUEA |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Science > Research Centres > Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE) Faculty of Science > Research Groups > Collaborative Centre for Sustainable Use of the Seas Faculty of Science > Research Groups > Environmental Social Sciences Faculty of Science > Research Groups > Resources, Sustainability and Governance (former - to 2018) |
Related URLs: | |
Depositing User: | Rosie Cullington |
Date Deposited: | 26 Feb 2011 11:40 |
Last Modified: | 11 Sep 2023 15:30 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/24686 |
DOI: |
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