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Turocy, Theodore L. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X, Watson, Elizabeth and Battalio, Raymond
(2007)
Framing the first-price auction.
Experimental Economics, 10 (1).
pp. 37-54.
Abstract
We revisit the result that, in laboratory independent private values auction, the first-price sealed bid and descending clock (or Dutch) implementations are not isomorphic. We investigate the hypothesis that this arises from framing and presentation effects. Our design focuses on a careful construction of subject interfaces that present the two environments as similarly as possible. Our sessions also consist of more auction periods to test whether any initial framing effects subsequently decrease over time. We find the difference between the implementations persists. To further investigate the difference, we report on an intermediate implementation which operates like the Dutch auction, but in which the clock continues to tick to the lowest price without informing bidders when others have bid on the object.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics (former - to 2017) Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics |
| Depositing User: | Gina Neff |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2011 11:19 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Aug 2023 15:30 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19303 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10683-006-9130-4 |
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