Covering your posterior: Teaching signaling games using classroom experiments

Turocy, Theodore L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X (2009) Covering your posterior: Teaching signaling games using classroom experiments. Journal of Economic Education, 40 (2). pp. 188-199. ISSN 2152-4068

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Abstract

The author describes a protocol for classroom experiments for courses that introduce undergraduates to signaling games. Signaling games are conceptually difficult because, when analyzing the game, students are not naturally inclined to think in probabilistic, Bayesian terms. The experimental design explicitly presents the posterior frequencies of the unobserved events. The protocol's emphasis on the posterior enhances convergence to the equilibrium prediction, relative to a treatment in which posterior frequencies are not explicitly computed. This convergence reinforces the development of the theory in subsequent lecture periods.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics (former - to 2017) Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Gina Neff
Date Deposited:	17 Jan 2011 11:20
Last Modified:	15 Jun 2023 16:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19296
DOI:	10.3200/JECE.40.2.188-199

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