Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

Saha, Bibhas (2009) Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products. Journal of Economics, 98 (1). pp. 25-43. ISSN 0931-8658

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Abstract

We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	11 Jan 2011 16:44
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2023 16:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19088
DOI:	10.1007/s00712-009-0075-x

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