Perino, Grischa (2010) How delegation improves commitment. Economics Letters, 106 (2). pp. 137-139.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Julia Sheldrake |
Date Deposited: | 11 Jan 2011 16:40 |
Last Modified: | 22 Dec 2022 15:31 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19087 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
View Item |