How delegation improves commitment

Perino, Grischa (2010) How delegation improves commitment. Economics Letters, 106 (2). pp. 137-139.

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Abstract

McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	11 Jan 2011 16:40
Last Modified:	22 Dec 2022 15:31
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19087
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005

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