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ToolsMcQuillin, Ben (2009) The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (2). pp. 696-721.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a “partition function” outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show that simultaneous consideration of the two elaborations (“generalization” and “extension”) obtains a unique Shapley-type value for games in partition function form. The key requirement is that the “Extended, Generalized Shapley Value” (EGSV) should be “recursive”: the EGSV of any game should be the EGSV of itself. This requirement forces us to ignore all but the payoffs to bilateral partitions. The EGSV can be conceptualized as the ex ante value of a process of successive bilateral amalgamations. Previous Shapley value extensions, if generalized, are not recursive; indeed, they iterate to the EGSV.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Julia Sheldrake |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jan 2011 16:34 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Apr 2023 00:48 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19083 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.010 |
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