Nash equilibrium, team reasoning and cognitive hierarchy theory

Sugden, Robert (2008) Nash equilibrium, team reasoning and cognitive hierarchy theory. Acta Psychologica, 128 (2). pp. 402-404.

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Abstract

This paper comments on two experiments, carried out by Colman, Pulford and Rose, which investigate the prevalence of team reasoning. I argue that because the first experiment uses ‘decomposable’ games, it cannot discriminate between team-reasoning and the conceptually distinct ‘prosocial’ orientation. In the second experiment, Colman et al. find more support for the team reasoning hypothesis than for the rival hypothesis that subjects choose Nash equilibrium strategies. I suggest that the most credible explanation of the data is that some subjects are team reasoners while others act according to cognitive hierarchy theory.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	nash equilibrium,team reasoning,cognitive hierarchy theory,social value orientation
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User:	Gina Neff
Date Deposited:	13 Jan 2011 11:08
Last Modified:	22 Apr 2023 01:09
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/18408
DOI:	10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.12.009

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