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ToolsSugden, Robert (2004) The opportunity criterion: consumer sovereignty without the assumption of coherent preferences. American Economic Review, 94 (4). pp. 1014-1033. ISSN 0002-8282
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
This paper proposes a formulation of consumer sovereignty, for use in normative economics, which does not presuppose individuals' preferences to be coherent. The fundamental intuition, that opportunity and responsibility have moral value, is formalized as an "opportunity criterion" for assessing resource allocation systems. A model of an exchange economy is presented in which rational arbitrageurs compete to make profits by trading with nonrational consumers. In equilibrium, this economy satisfies the opportunity criterion. One interpretation of this result is that, in a competitive environment, the overall effects of money pumps are benign, even if individuals' preferences are unstable or incoherent.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Vishal Gautam |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Sep 2004 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2023 14:42 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/16593 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/0002828042002714 |
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