Tools
Tools
Poulsen, Anders U. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595 and Tinggaard Svendsen, Gert
(2005)
Social capital and endogenous preferences.
Public Choice, 123 (2).
pp. 171-196.
ISSN 0048-5829
Abstract
In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other’s preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society’s ability to generate cooperative outcomes.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics |
| Depositing User: | Vishal Gautam |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Apr 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Jan 2024 01:22 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/16521 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |