Information and Endogenous First Mover Advantages in the Ultimatum Game

Poulsen, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595 (2007) Information and Endogenous First Mover Advantages in the Ultimatum Game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 64 (1). pp. 129-143. ISSN 0167-2681

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Item Type: Article
Additional Information: mid:11706 dc:ueastatus:post-print formatted dc:ueahesastaffidentifier:0511176308222
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Vishal Gautam
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2010 18:02
Last Modified: 24 Oct 2022 01:29
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/16365
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013

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