Information and Endogenous First Mover Advantages in the Ultimatum Game

Poulsen, Anders U. ORCID: (2007) Information and Endogenous First Mover Advantages in the Ultimatum Game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 64 (1). pp. 129-143. ISSN 0167-2681

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We endogenize the first mover advantage in an evolutionary analysis of an ultimatum game where Responders are characterized by acceptance thresholds and Proposers by decision rules for how to condition offers on any available information about thresholds. The higher is the probability of receiving correct information about thresholds, and the lower its price, the larger is the share of the surplus that Responders obtain. While reliable and cheap information about Responders’ thresholds is desirable to an individual Proposer, in the long run it hurts Proposers as a group.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: mid:11706 dc:ueastatus:post-print formatted dc:ueahesastaffidentifier:0511176308222
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Vishal Gautam
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2010 18:02
Last Modified: 22 Apr 2023 01:20
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013

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