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Poulsen, Anders U. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595
(2007)
Information and endogenous first mover advantages in the ultimatum game.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 64 (1).
pp. 129-143.
ISSN 0167-2681
Abstract
We endogenize the first mover advantage in an evolutionary analysis of an ultimatum game where Responders are characterized by acceptance thresholds and Proposers by decision rules for how to condition offers on any available information about thresholds. The higher is the probability of receiving correct information about thresholds, and the lower its price, the larger is the share of the surplus that Responders obtain. While reliable and cheap information about Responders’ thresholds is desirable to an individual Proposer, in the long run it hurts Proposers as a group.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | mid:11706 dc:ueastatus:post-print formatted dc:ueahesastaffidentifier:0511176308222 |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Vishal Gautam |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Dec 2010 18:02 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2023 00:38 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/16365 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013 |
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