Tools
ToolsPoulsen, Anders U. and Roos, Michael W. M. (2010) Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance. Experimental Economics, 13 (2). pp. 206-225.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Gina Neff |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Nov 2010 16:02 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Mar 2025 03:08 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10850 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10683-010-9236-6 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |