Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

Poulsen, Anders U. and Roos, Michael W. M. (2010) Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance. Experimental Economics, 13 (2). pp. 206-225.

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Abstract

Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Depositing User:	Gina Neff
Date Deposited:	16 Nov 2010 16:02
Last Modified:	12 Oct 2025 18:32
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10850
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-010-9236-6

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