Stability and resilience of alliances: A network approach

Polanski, Arnold and Cortes-Corrales, Sebastian (2026) Stability and resilience of alliances: A network approach. Journal of Public Economics, 256. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

Public-goods models of alliances examine the trade-off between the benefits of a collectively provided good and the private costs of contribution. This line of inquiry prompts a further question: what makes alliances endure? We contribute by characterizing alliance stability and resilience using graph-theoretic concepts, offering a structural explanation for why some alliances persist while others do not. Our framework embeds alliances in node- and edge-weighted networks: links among allies generate positive externalities, whereas links between allies and adversaries capture negative externalities. We relate the resilience of alliances – and of their members – to the members’ core numbers within the alliance-induced subnetwork. We then analyze strategic stability when members choose the magnitude of the externalities through costly contributions and the redistribution of spillovers. Finally, we apply the framework to assess the resilience and stability of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Data availability: Data will be made available on request.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	public goods,networks,alliances,nato
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Science > Research Groups > Statistics
Related URLs:	https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ar...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2026 12:30
Last Modified:	23 Mar 2026 12:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/102556
DOI:	issn:0047-2727

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