Coordination and transfer

Cooper, David J. and Van Huyck, John (2018) Coordination and transfer. Experimental Economics, 21 (3). 487–512. ISSN 1386-4157

[img]
Preview
PDF (Accepted manuscript) - Submitted Version
Download (315kB) | Preview

    Abstract

    We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248, 1990, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910, 1991). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less sensitive to the order statistic than when a fixed order statistic is used throughout. This is consistent with the prediction of a simple learning model with transfer. If subjects play a series of similar stag hunt games, play converges to the payoff dominant equilibrium when a convention emerges, replicating the main result of Rankin et al. (Games Econ Behav 32:315–337, 2000). When these subjects subsequently play a random sequence of order statistic games, play is shifted towards the payoff dominant equilibrium relative to subjects without previous experience. The data is consistent with subjects absorbing a general principle, play of the payoff dominant equilibrium, and applying it in a new related setting.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: coordination,transfer,learning
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 31 May 2018 10:30
    Last Modified: 06 Nov 2018 15:47
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/67255
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9521-8

    Actions (login required)

    View Item