Legitimacy, Communication, and Leadership in the Turnaround Game

Brandts, Jordi, Cooper, David J. and Weber, Roberto A. (2014) Legitimacy, Communication, and Leadership in the Turnaround Game. Management Science, 61 (11). pp. 2627-2645. ISSN 0025-1909

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Abstract

We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. Although all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group’s outcome than randomly selected leaders. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observe that a combination of factors—specifically, incentive increases and communication from elected leaders—yields near-universal turnarounds to full efficiency.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: leadership,job selection,coordination failure,experiments,communication
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 16 Apr 2018 15:30
Last Modified: 06 Nov 2018 15:47
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66778
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2021

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