Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

Hougaard, Jens Lars, Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., Tvede, Mich and Østerdal, Lars Peter (2017) Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. pp. 98-110. ISSN 0899-8256

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    Abstract

    We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: hierarchies,joint ventures,resource allocation,geometric rules,mit strategy
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 09 May 2017 06:08
    Last Modified: 09 Apr 2019 12:10
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63403
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

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