Bargaining over communal endowments after prior interaction: Experimental evidence

Xue, Lian, Sitzia, Stefania and Turocy, Theodore L. (2025) Bargaining over communal endowments after prior interaction: Experimental evidence. Economic Theory. ISSN 1432-0479 (In Press)

PDF (Bargaining_over_communal_endowments_after_prior_interaction__Experimental_evidence (1)) - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 31 December 2099. Request a copy

Abstract

We report on a laboratory experiment that identifies the role that prior interaction plays in determining claims in subsequent bargaining. We implement a tacit bargaining game, in which a pair of players attempt to agree on an allocation of a discrete set of objects between them. Prior to the bargaining, in some treatments the pair jointly completes a route-finding task. We find that pairs who have this prior interaction are more likely to come to an agreement in bargaining. These more frequent agreements result not from a reduction in the value of the objects people claim, but because they coordinate more successfully on an allocation which is suggested by the way in which the bargaining game is described. This observation is evidence that prior interaction alone makes people more likely to apply principles of team reasoning to attempt to resolve the strategic conflict in bargaining.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	bargaining,joint production,experiment,team reasoning,focal points,3* ,/dk/atira/pure/researchoutput/REFrank/3_
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	28 Apr 2025 11:30
Last Modified:	28 Apr 2025 11:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/99120
DOI:	issn:1432-0479

Actions (login required)

View Item