Participation of Family Firms in the Market for Corporate Control:A Mixed Gamble Approach

Hussinger, Katrin and Issah, Abdul-Basit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0942-8228 (2017) Participation of Family Firms in the Market for Corporate Control:A Mixed Gamble Approach. In: Academy of Management Proceedings. UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

We draw from the concept of mixed gambles to investigate the socioemotional wealth trade-offs associated with high risk strategic decisions such as firm acquisition decisions of family firms. We contrast the predictions from mixed gambles with those of the commonly used behavioural agency model (BAM). Our empirical results for a panel data set of large U.S. firms support the mixed gambles predictions and reject those derived from BAM. They reveal that family firms are more likely to engage in horizontal acquisitions than non-family firms and that the engagement of family firms in horizontal acquisitions is even higher when they are in a gain frame.

Item Type: Book Section
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Strategy and Entrepreneurship
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2024 14:30
Last Modified: 24 Sep 2024 08:26
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/94672
DOI: 10.5465/AMBPP.2017.15616abstract

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