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Kuusela, Oskari 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9345-9499
(2024)
Kripke and Wittgenstein on Rule-Following:The Problem of Empty Philosophical Explanations.
In:
Wittgenstein on Practice.
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 53-75.
ISBN 978-3-031-68655-9
Abstract
In my paper I raise questions about the kind of explanation that is given when it is said that rule-following is a practice or that rule-following involves or is based on communal agreement. I argue, and take Wittgenstein to hold, that a certain type of explanation, often attributed to Wittgenstein, where communal agreement figures as a necessary condition for the possibility of rule-following, something upon which a rule having certain definite sense depends, is problematic. Closer inspection reveals such explanations to be empty. They constitute merely apparent explanations that can’t do the explanatory job they are intended to do, and are better understood as merely descriptive. Consequently, the role of practice as part of a grammatical clarification of what rule following is, must be understood differently. In the last part of the paper I outline such an account which I believe to be a better fit with Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach and methodological ideas.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies (former - to 2024) |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Wittgenstein |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Mar 2024 16:25 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Dec 2024 01:11 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/94373 |
| DOI: |
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