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ToolsKuusela, Oskari (2024) Kripke and Wittgenstein on Rule-Following:The Problem of Empty Philosophical Explanations. In: Wittgenstein on Practice. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 53-75. ISBN 978-3-031-68655-9
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This chapter discusses the question, what kind of explanation is given when rule-following is characterized as a practice or as involving or based on communal agreement, and how Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following should be understood in light of his philosophical methodology. I argue that certain kinds of explanations, often attributed to Wittgenstein and discussed in this chapter with reference to Kripke, that treat communal agreement as a condition of possibility and a ground of rule-following, are problematic. Such explanations are not consistent with Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology, and closer inspection reveals them to be empty pseudo-explanations that cannot do the intended philosophical work. Thus, as I argue, Kripke’s account merely pushes the problem about rules one step further, where it arises again as a problem about understanding communal agreement. Instead the characterization of rule-following as a practice is better construed as clarificatory description that ascribes a role to linguistic practices and communal agreement as the background or context against which instances of rule-following, having certain intentions and understanding meanings are possible.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies (former - to 2024) |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Wittgenstein |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Mar 2024 16:25 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Aug 2025 14:30 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/94373 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-031-68656-6_4 |
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