Collins, John (2004) Faculty Disputes. Mind and Language, 19 (5). pp. 300-333. ISSN 0268-1064
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Jerry Fodor, among others, has maintained that Chomsky's language faculty hypothesis is an epistemological proposal, i.e. the faculty comprises propositional structures known (cognized) by the speaker/hearer. Fodor contrasts this notion of a faculty with an architectural (directly causally efficacious) notion of a module. The paper offers an independent characterisation of the language faculty as an abstractly specified non-propositional structure of the mind/brain that mediates between sound and meaning—a function in intension that maps to a pair of structures that determine sound-meaning convergence. This conception will be elaborated and defended against a number of likely complaints deriving from Fodor's faculty/module distinction and other positions which seek to credit knowledge of language with an empirical or theoretical significance. A recent explicit argument from Fodor that Chomsky must share his conception will be diagnosed and the common appeal to implicit knowledge as a foundation for linguistic competence will be rejected.
Item Type: | Article |
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Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Philosophy (former - to 2014) |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy |
Depositing User: | EPrints Services |
Date Deposited: | 01 Oct 2010 13:56 |
Last Modified: | 21 Jul 2023 09:28 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/9139 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00270.x |
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