On the input problem for massive modularity

Collins, John (2005) On the input problem for massive modularity. Minds and Machines, 15 (2). pp. 1-22. ISSN 1572-8641

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Abstract

Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the ‘input problem’: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a ‘really real’ input problem (i.e., an empirical one). It will be suggested that this problem is real enough, but it does not selectively strike down massive modularity – it is a problem for everyone.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Philosophy (former - to 2014)
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Depositing User:	EPrints Services
Date Deposited:	01 Oct 2010 13:56
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2025 01:07
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/8870
DOI:	10.1007/s11023-004-1346-5

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