Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions

Prüfer, Jens ORCID: and Walz, Uwe (2013) Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions. Public Choice, 155 (3-4). pp. 507-529. ISSN 0048-5829

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We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: academic faculties,labor market competition,status organizations,university governance,sociology and political science,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3312
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 08 Sep 2022 12:30
Last Modified: 21 Oct 2023 00:42
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9885-9

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