Trade associations, lobbying, and endogenous institutions

Larrain, Maria and Prüfer, Jens ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7203-9711 (2015) Trade associations, lobbying, and endogenous institutions. Journal of Legal Analysis, 7 (2). pp. 467-516. ISSN 2161-7201

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

This article explores whether positive or negative effects of trade associations-private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members-on the economy prevail.Weconstruct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We show that, all else equal, the incentives of associations to lobby for better property rights are highest when property rights are unprotected. In turn, incentives to seek rents are strongest when property rights are well protected. This suggests that associations can be a valuable private ordering institution when governments are ineffective but recommends caution when governments supply a functioning legal system.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Publisher Copyright: © The Author 2015.
Uncontrolled Keywords: law ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3308
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 08 Sep 2022 12:30
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2022 02:49
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/87952
DOI: 10.1093/jla/lav009

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item