Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition

Crès, Hervé and Tvede, Mich (2023) Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition. Economic Theory, 75 (4). 1181–1205. ISSN 1432-0479

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Abstract

We consider Cournot competition in general equilibrium. Decisions in firms are taken by majority voting. Naturally, interests of voters-shareholders or stakeholders-depend on their endowments and portfolios. Indeed, voters in every firm are concerned about the return on their portfolios rather than their shares in the firm. We introduce two notions of local Cournot-Walras equilibria to overcome difficulties arising from non-concavity of profit functions and multiplicity of equilibrium prices. We show existence of local Cournot-Walras equilibria, and characterize distributions of voting weights for which equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal. We discuss the efficiency of various governance modes and highlight the importance of financial markets in regulating large firms.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Funding Information: Hervé Crès gratefully acknowledges support from Tamkeen under the NYUAD Research Institute award for project CG005 and from the Center for Institutional Behavioral Design (C-BID).
Uncontrolled Keywords:	cournot-walras equilibrium,majority voting,pareto optimality,shareholder governance,stakeholder democracy,walrasian equilibria,cournot–walras equilibrium,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	21 Jul 2022 08:30
Last Modified:	21 Aug 2023 01:21
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/86777
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-022-01443-3

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