The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games

Fallucchi, Francesco, Luccasen, R. Andrew and Turocy, Theodore L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X (2022) The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games. Games and Economic Behavior. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We extend the study of behavioural types in voluntary contribution games, adapting the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. Our results in the standard VCM game align with previous findings in many respects; in particular, we identify one-quarter of participants as a distinctive group of “strong” conditional cooperators. We provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group by tracking their contribution strategies as the financial incentives of the game vary. We find that conditional cooperators follow a sophisticated rule, matching contributions only when doing so leads to an overall welfare improvement. This favours an account of conditional cooperation based on social norm compliance, rather than confusion, inequity aversion, or warm-glow giving. Keywords: public goods, conditional cooperation, sophistication, experiment.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Funding information: Fallucchi and Turocy acknowledge the support of the Network for Integrated Behavioural Science (Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/K002201/1). The Network also provided the funds for participant payments in the reported experiments.
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2022 12:30
Last Modified: 16 Aug 2022 00:23
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/85953
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.004

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