Banuri, Sheheryar, Eckel, Catherine and Wilson, Rick K. (2022) Does cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab. Economic Inquiry, 60 (3). pp. 1092-1110. ISSN 0095-2583
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Abstract
Cronyism in firms arises when favoritism toward an ingroup affects personnel decisions. Two main motives underlie cronyism: profit, if an ingroup employee works harder; or altruism, if used to transfer resources. In a lab-experiment trust game with naturally-occurring groups, an employer (proposer) faces an employee (responder) who is or is not an ingroup member. We see that both motives play a role. Cronyism is more likely from employers who are more altruistic to the ingroup in a dictator game; and even low-productivity (by design) ingroup members reciprocate trust generously. Cronyism pays for those who engage in it.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | Research Funding: National Science Foundation. Grant Number: SES-0921884 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | cronyism,group identity,ingroup,discrimination,trust,reciprocity,lab experiment,trust,group identity,lab experiment,reciprocity,cronyism,discrimination,ingroup,economics and econometrics,business, management and accounting(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Related URLs: | |
Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 08 Feb 2022 10:30 |
Last Modified: | 23 Oct 2022 03:31 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/83343 |
DOI: | 10.1111/ecin.13080 |
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