Crowdfunding under market feedback, asymmetric information and overconfident entrepreneur

Miglo, Anton (2021) Crowdfunding under market feedback, asymmetric information and overconfident entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship Research Journal, 11 (4). ISSN 2157-5665

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Abstract

This article is the first one that considers a model of the choice between the different types of crowdfunding, which contains elements of the asymmetric information approach and behavioral finance (overconfident entrepreneurs). The model provides several implications, most of which have not yet been tested. Our model predicts that equity-based crowdfunding is more profitable than reward-based crowdfunding when an entrepreneur is overconfident. This is because the entrepreneur learns from the sale of shares before making production decisions. The model also predicts that an equilibrium can exist where some firms use equity-based crowdfunding, which contrasts the results of traditional theories (which have rational managers), for example, the pecking-order theory. It also contrasts traditional behavioral finance literature (e. g. Fairchild, R. 2005. “The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence, Asymmetric Information, and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.” ICFAI Journal of Behavioral Finance 2 (4).) where equity is not issued in equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: entrepreneurial finance,crowdfunding,asymmetric information,overconfidence,equity-based crowdfunding,reward-based crowdfunding,entrepreneurship and learning
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 20 Oct 2021 03:28
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2021 01:45
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/81789
DOI: 10.1515/erj-2019-0018

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