Capital structure and earnings manipulation

Miglo, A. (2010) Capital structure and earnings manipulation. Journal of Economics and Business, 62 (5). pp. 367-382.

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Abstract

We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double-moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his effort, investment is below the optimal level and production effort is socially inefficient. The opportunity to manipulate earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of a low payoff when production is unsuccessful. Ex ante, this provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase investment and improve effort.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: earnings manipulation,intertemporal substitution,design of securities,property rights,double-moral hazard
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2021 01:16
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 03:28
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/81771
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2010.05.001

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