If philosophers aren’t using intuitions as evidence, what are they doing?

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Andow, James (2021) If philosophers aren’t using intuitions as evidence, what are they doing? Dialectica, 75 (2). ISSN 0012-2017

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Abstract

Various philosophers have recently argued for a descriptive account of philosophical methodology in which philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. This paper raises and considers an objection to such accounts. The objection is that such accounts render various aspects of philosophical practice inexplicable. The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that one can provide a satisfactory account of the relevant aspects of philosophical practice without saying that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. One could, for example, maintain that the relevant aspects of philosophical practice serve purely explanatory roles.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies (former - to 2024)
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Related URLs:	https://www.philosophie.ch/andow-2021
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	15 Apr 2021 23:51
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2024 01:25
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/79792
DOI:	issn:0012-2017

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