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Biernaskie, Jay M., Grafen, Alan and Perry, Jennifer C. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8449-2764
(2014)
The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty.
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 281 (1790).
ISSN 0962-8452
Abstract
Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2020 01:15 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Oct 2022 07:26 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/77621 |
| DOI: | 10.1098/rspb.2014.0876 |
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