Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s Vulnerablity Objection

Sugden, Robert (2021) Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s Vulnerablity Objection. Philosophical Studies, 178 (5). 1719–1729. ISSN 0031-8116

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In ‘Strategic Justice’, Vanderschraaf argues that many existing theories of justice as mutual advantage, including Hume’s, are not ‘proper accounts of justice’ because they deny the benefits of justice to people who are unable to contribute to the cooperative surplus. Vanderschraaf presents a model in which a practice of giving aid to vulnerable people can be a convention, and argues that this exemplifies justice as mutual advantage. I argue that this convention is not mutually advantageous. According to Hume’s theory, it creates moral obligations of humanity but not of justice.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: hume,vanderschraaf,vulnerability objection,justice as mutual advantage,arts and humanities(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 28 May 2020 00:20
Last Modified: 24 May 2022 14:00
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01500-4

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