Money or morality:fairness ideals in unstructured bargaining

Luhan, Wolfgang J., Poulsen, Odile and Roos, Michael W.M. (2019) Money or morality:fairness ideals in unstructured bargaining. Social Choice and Welfare, 53 (4). pp. 655-675. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We augment the Nash bargaining solution by fairness ideals in order to predict the outcomes of unstructured bargaining after the individual production of a joint surplus. If production depends on individual effort, talent, and luck, fairness ideals might be based on the accountability principle. In a lab experiment with real production and unstructured bargaining, we investigate subjects’ fairness ideals, their bargaining behaviour, and the outcomes of the bargaining process. As impartial spectators, about 75% of the subjects hold meritocratic or libertarian fairness ideals. However, these ideals do not affect their bargaining behaviour which is strongly opportunistic. Therefore the fairness-augmented Nash solution with opportunistic fairness ideals predicts the bargaining outcome best.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: social sciences (miscellaneous),economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3301
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 09 Aug 2019 14:30
Last Modified: 11 Jun 2020 01:13
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/71929
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01206-5

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