Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study

Le Quement, Mark and Marcin, Isabel (2020) Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 174. pp. 449-468. ISSN 0167-2681

[img] PDF (Accepted_Manuscript) - Submitted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 18 December 2020.

Download (1MB) | Request a copy

Abstract

We study experimentally the drivers of behavior in committees featuring publicly known diverse preference who engage in voting preceded by one shot cheap talk communication. On the aggregate, we find low lying levels and different preference types using decision rules biased towards the majority heuristic which consists in following the majority of announced signals. Our results are inconsistent with the predictions derived from the standard model as well as models of social preferences and homogeneous naive behavior. Results are instead consistent with the predictions of a model of cognitive heterogeneity, in which a large majority of unsophisticated subjects truth-tells and uses the majority decision heuristic, while a minority of sophisticated agents lies strategically and applies its payoff-maximizing decision rule, albeit with noise.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: cheap talk,committees,experiment,information aggregation,voting,economics and econometrics,organizational behavior and human resource management ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2019 11:30
Last Modified: 08 Jul 2020 23:56
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/69989
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.020

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item