Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement

Davies, Stephen, Mariuzzo, Franco ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4604-1054 and Ormosi, Peter L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6472-6511 (2018) Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement. Economic Inquiry, 56 (4). pp. 1933-1949. ISSN 0095-2583

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This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: anti-competitive harm,cartels,detection,deterrence,monte carlo stimulation,selection bias
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 13 Feb 2018 15:30
Last Modified: 24 Apr 2023 23:42
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66290
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12574

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