Andow, James ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5760-0475
(2017)
Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?
Synthese, 194 (7).
pp. 2631-2643.
ISSN 0039-7857
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Abstract
Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!
Item Type: | Article |
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Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy |
Related URLs: | |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 23 Jan 2018 15:30 |
Last Modified: | 22 Oct 2022 03:29 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66051 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-016-1071-7 |
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