Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Andow, James (2017) Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? Synthese, 194 (7). pp. 2631-2643. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > UEA Experimental Philosophy Group
Related URLs:	http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	23 Jan 2018 15:30
Last Modified:	01 May 2024 23:50
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66051
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-016-1071-7

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